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Strengthen Korea’s Anti-Corruption Efforts
Sang Beck Kim*
Abstract: Corruption, both in the public and private sector, has long plagued
Korea’s economy. Unfortunately, the detection of corruption and bribery is
inherently difficult because the crime is by its nature self-concealing. Thus,
governments heavily rely on inside information for detection and prosecution of
bribery. Such inside information comes through primarily two types of sources:
(i) self-reporting by wrongdoers, and (ii) whistleblowers with inside knowledge.
However, Korea’s legal sanction regime does not sufficiently incentivize
corporations and individuals to self-report or come forward to reveal
misconduct. This Comment proposes that Korea’s current anti-corruption laws
could be strengthened by embracing the two regulatory tools that have proven
very effective in bringing forth inside information in the U.S. context: (i) The
Department of Justice’s Antitrust Amnesty Program, and (ii) the False Claims
Act (FCA) Qui Tam Enforcement Model. Overall, the adoption of these features
would establish a “carrots and sticks” regulatory framework for optimal
enforcement of Korean anti-corruption laws.
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INTRODUCTION
Corruption is a disease that affects all sectors of society.1 It is not only
a matter of ethics; its deleterious impact on economic, political, and social
development is clear. Corruption distorts market mechanisms,2 deters
domestic and foreign investments, undermines the rule of law, and leads to
inefficient use of public resources.3 The World Economic Forum estimates
that the cost of corruption amounts to over five percent of global GDP with
more than US$ 1 trillion paid in bribes each year.4 Korea is no exception.5
Corruption, both in the public and private sector, has long plagued Korea’s
economy.6
Unfortunately, the detection of corruption and bribery is inherently
difficult because the crime is by its nature self-concealing.7 Thus,
governments heavily rely on “inside information” for detection and
prosecution of bribery.8 Such inside information comes through primarily
1

The most widely accepted definition of corruption is arguably that proposed by Transparency
International and the World Bank: Corruption is “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain.” FAQs
on Corruption, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, http://www.transparency.org/whoweare/organisation/
faqs_on_corruption/2/#defineCorruption (last visited Jan. 23, 2014). Because this definition focuses on
the feature of exchange, corruption is generally treated as being equivalent to the conduct of bribery,
which includes offering or promising money or advantages to officials in order to influence their
decisions. See UNITED NATIONS ACTION AGAINST CORRUPTION AND BRIBERY, UNITED NATIONS CRIME
AND JUSTICE INFORMATION NETWORK (1997), http://www.uncjin.org/Documents/corrupt.htm. This
Comment uses the terms corruption and bribery interchangeably throughout its analysis.
2
Private Sector, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, http://www.transparency.org/topic/detail/private_sector
(last visited Jan. 23, 2014).
3
OECD, THE RATIONALE FOR FIGHTING CORRUPTION (2014), http://www.oecd.org/cleangovbiz
/49693613.pdf.
4
WORLD ECON. F., CLEAN BUSINESS IS GOOD BUSINESS (2008), http://www.weforum.org/
pdf/paci/BusinessCaseAgainstCorruption.pdf. But see John Hogarth, Bribery of Officials in Pursuit of
Corporate Aims, 6 CRIM. L.F. 557, 559 (1995) (arguing that it is incorrect to assume that corruption
creates costs and market inefficiencies without any counterbalancing economic benefits).
5
The Korean peninsula is divided into two sovereignties: the Republic of Korea, commonly known
as South Korea, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, commonly known as North Korea.
Since North Korea is not discussed in this Comment, I refer to South Korea as “Korea,” and use
“Korean” to mean “South Korean.” This is purely for stylistic reasons.
6
See discussion infra Part I.
7
Christopher R. Leslie, Replicating the Success of Antitrust Amnesty, 90 TEX. L. REV. 171, 180
(2012).
8
Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (2002) (“No matter how talented or
dedicated our public law enforcement personnel may be . . . a public regulatory system will always lack
the one resource that is indispensable to effective detection and deterrence of complex economic
wrongdoing: inside information.”); Susan Rose-Ackerman, The Law and Economics of Bribery and
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two types of sources: (i) self-reporting by wrongdoers, and (ii)
whistleblowers with inside knowledge.9 Without these resources,
enforcement agencies “cannot effectively detect, prove, or deter complex
economic crime or public corruption.”10 It is against this backdrop that the
inadequacy of Korea’s anti-corruption efforts becomes clear: Korea’s legal
sanction regime does not sufficiently incentivize corporations and
individuals to self-report or come forward to reveal misconduct.11
This Comment proposes that Korea’s current anti-corruption laws
could be strengthened by embracing the two regulatory tools that have
proven very effective in bringing forth inside information in the U.S.
context: (i) The Department of Justice’s Antitrust Amnesty Program, and
(ii) the False Claims Act (FCA) Qui Tam Enforcement Model. Part I

Extortion, 6 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 217, 222 (2010) (“Successful detection of corruption depends
upon insiders to report wrongdoing. Citizens and businesses victimized by extortion demands may
report bribery attempts, but they may not be able to offer enough proof for prosecutors to act.”).
9
These sources have been identified by several authors as critical to white-collar crime
enforcement, but no scholarship to my knowledge has examined them together in the context of anticorruption. See infra note 108 and accompanying text. In Korea, 50.9% of all corruption reports that led
to investigations by the government from 2002 to 2013 were based on whistleblower tips. More notably,
83.8% or KRW 470 billion (approximately US$ 470 million) of the total monetary sanctions collected
by the government for violations of anti-bribery laws during that time span was attributed to such tips.
ACRC KOREA, ACRC KOREA ANNUAL REPORT 2013, http://www.acrc.go.kr/eng/board.do?
command=searchDetail&method=searchDetailViewInc&menuId=020504&confId=64&conConfId=64
&conTabId=0&currPageNo=1&boardNum=38083 (last visited Aug. 8, 2014) [hereinafter ACRC
REPORT]. In the United States, 44 of the 68 disclosed foreign bribery investigations under the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in 2005–2007 were “voluntarily disclosed” to the enforcement agencies
after the companies conducted internal investigations. SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, RECENT TRENDS &
PATTERNS IN FCPA ENFORCEMENT 8 (Feb. 13, 2008), http://fcpa.shearman.com/files/9dd/
9dd85aee0438b6d5da89106614e4c5ae.pdf?i=e768b7880085f9a83bf29a5515f38b6f;
see
also
O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT HANDBOOK 92, 93 (6th ed. 2009),
http://www.omm.com/files/upload/OMelvenyMyers_Sixth_Edition_FCPA_Handbook.pdf
(reporting
that, in 2006, “17 of 22 newly disclosed FCPA investigations were voluntarily disclosed to the DOJ or
SEC after the companies conducted internal investigations”). According to the 2014 Global Fraud
Report by the U.S. Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE), 42.2% of the “occupational
fraud” cases in 2014 were detected due to “tips”—that is, insiders were the source of nearly half of all
tips that led to the detection of fraud. ACFE classifies occupational fraud into three sub-categories: asset
misappropriation, corruption, and financial statement fraud. Of these, 37% of cases involved corruption.
A full 72.3% of cases were detected from sources within the organization (tips 42.2%; management
review 16%; internal audits 14.1%), whereas only 12% of cases arose out of external sources
(notification by law enforcement (2.2%); external audits (3%); by accident (6.8%)). ACFE, ACFE 2014
REPORT
TO
THE
NATIONS
ON
OCCUPATIONAL
FRAUD
AND
ABUSE
(2014),
http://www.acfe.com/rttn/docs/2014-report-to-nations.pdf. In China, more than 70% of all public
corruption cases reported in 2008 were prosecuted based on whistleblowing tips. Wendy Wysong et al.,
Blowing the Whistle on Corruption in the U.S. and China, CORP. COMPLIANCE INSIGHTS (Sep. 29,
2011), http://www.corporatecomplianceinsights.com/blowing-the-whistle-on-corruption-in-the-u-s-andchina/.
10
Bucy, supra note 8, at 8.
11
See discussion infra Part III.
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describes the current and pervasive problem of corruption in Korea. Part II
examines the substance of Korea’s anti-bribery laws in light of its national
policy objectives. Part III analyzes the shortcomings of these provisions
through the lens of the Optimal Enforcement Theory.12 Part IV identifies
two U.S. regulatory techniques, the Antitrust Amnesty Program and the
FCA Qui Tam Actions, as viable solutions to Korea’s current problems and
examines their applicability in the Korean context. In particular, this
Comment argues that the adoption of these features would establish a
“carrots and sticks” regulatory framework for optimal enforcement of
Korean anti-corruption laws.
I. CORRUPTION IN KOREA
The “Miracle on the Han River” is a phrase often used to refer to
Korea’s rapid economic growth from the 1960s to the late 1990s. Once one
of the world’s poorest economies, Korea transformed into a wealthy and
developed nation with a globally influential economy in less than four
decades.13 But the system that produced Korea’s remarkable success
“eroded its own base.”14 Corruption was an integral feature of the
relationships among government officials, financial institutions, and
conglomerates during the decades of Korea’s rapid economic development
and was one of the root causes of the nation’s massive economic and
financial crisis in 1997.15
In a famous case from the 1990s, the heads of nine chaebols were
convicted of paying bribes to former Presidents Chun Doo Hwan and Roh
Tae Woo.16 Chaebols are large family-owned industrial conglomerates in
Korea, including, among others, Samsung, LG, SK, and the Hyundai Motor
Group.17 It was found that the Daewoo Group (the second largest
conglomerate in Korea after the Hyundai Group before it collapsed in 1999)
paid about US$ 31 million in bribes to Roh, including a US$ 6.5 million
12

See discussion infra Part II.A.
Korea ranks 12th by purchasing power parity (PPP) and 15th in the world by nominal GDP,
identifying it as one of the G-20 major economies. The World Fact Book, CIA,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ks.html (last updated Jan. 7, 2014).
The World Economic Forum (WEF)’s Global Competitive Index ranked Korea 19th overall in global
competitiveness, among 144 nations surveyed. WORLD ECON. F., THE GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS
REPORT 2012–2013 (2013), http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-report-2012-2013/.
14
Craig P. Ehrlich & Dae Seob Kang, Independence and Corruption in Korea, 16 COLUM. J. ASIAN
L. 1, 3 (2002).
15
Id.
16
Id. at 36.
17
For a comprehensive discussion on the Chaebol business practice and culture, see Joongi Kim, A
Forensic Study of Daewoo’s Corporate Governance: Does Responsibility for the Meltdown Solely Lie
with the Chaebol and Korea?, 28 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 273 (2008); Craig Ehrlich & Dae-Seob Kang,
U.S. Style Corporate Governance in Korea’s Largest Companies, 18 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 1 (2000).
13
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bribe to win a submarine base construction contract18; Samsung Group paid
Roh US$ 25 million to obtain permission to engage in the car
manufacturing business.19 The court also found ex-Presidents Chun and
Roh guilty of amassing hundreds of millions of dollars in presidential slush
funds during their respective terms in office.20
In response to these findings and in the wake of the 1997 Asian
Financial crisis, Korea adopted several reform measures to root out corrupt
practices in business and politics. These measures are further discussed in
Part II. Many studies indicate that compared to other East Asian economies,
Korea has performed relatively well in combating private sector corruption.
Its rapid recovery from the 1997 crisis has largely been attributed to the
nation’s successful financial sector reforms, aiming to improve
transparency and enhance business ethics in its financial institutions and
capital markets.21 Businesses have been taking a more systematic and
comprehensive approach to their internal compliance programs and are
starting to align with global standards of corporate social responsibility with
the launching of the UN Global Compact Network Korea in 2007.22
While these reforms have undeniably helped the nation to overcome
the crisis and enhance transparency, corruption and bribery still remain a
threat to contemporary Korea.23 Korea’s public sector ranked just 46th out
18

Teresa Watanabe, South Korean Ex-President Arrested: Corruption: Roh Tae Woo Is Jailed on
Charges of Taking More Than $300 Million in Bribes from Business Tycoons, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 17,
1995), http://articles.latimes.com/1995-11-17/news/mn-4124_1_roh-tae-woo.
19
Ehrlich & Kang, supra note 14, at 36–37; see also Verena Blechinger, Report on Recent Bribery
Scandals, 1996-2000 (Transparency Int’l, Working Paper, 2000), http://www2.law.columbia.edu/
course_00S_L9436_001/2004/s_korea_pape.pdf.
20
Former President Roh amassed around US$ 650 million in a presidential slush fund during his
term in office, of which US$ 300 million was unaccounted for. Watanabe, supra note 18; Ehrlich &
Kang, supra note 14, at 37.
21
“Following the 1997–98 Asian financial crisis, South Korea made significant progress in
reforming its financial institutions and capital markets.” 2013 Investment Climate Statement—Republic
of Korea, U.S. DEP’T ST., http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2013/204670.htm (last visited Jan. 23,
2014). Korea is also recognized as one of the world’s most improved business reformers by the World
Bank and IFC’s Doing Business, for several regulatory reforms on, among other things, taxation,
investor protections, and bankruptcy. Doing Business 2012: Doing Business in a More Transparent
World, INT’L FIN. CORP., http://www.doingbusiness.org/reports/global-reports/doing-business-2012 (last
visited Jan. 24, 2014); BUSINESS ANTI-CORRUPTION PORTAL, http://www.business-anticorruption.com/country-profiles/east-asia-the-pacific/republic-of-korea/general-information.aspx (last
visited Jan. 24, 2014).
22
BUSINESS ANTI-CORRUPTION PORTAL, supra note 21. The United Nations Global Compact
(UNGC) is the world’s largest, global corporate citizenship initiative that is committed to encouraging
businesses and markets to adopt “sustainable and socially responsible policies, and to report on their
implementation.” The UNGC Network Korea was established in 2007, which has 114 participating
businesses.
GLOBAL
COMPACT
NETWORK
KOREA,
https://www.unglobalcompact.org/
NetworksAroundTheWorld/local_network_sheet/KR.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2015).
23
One article suggests that, “corruption is based on aspects of the culture, and that what a
Westerner sees as corruption a Korean may regard as an appropriate expression of friendship or
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of 177 countries in the 2013 Transparency International (TI) Corruption
Perceptions Index.24 Nor did Korea fare well on another TI index, the Bribe
Payers Index, which placed Korea 13th out of 28 exporting nations in
2011.25 According to the 2013 OECD report, Korea’s level of transparency
(global corruption awareness) is 27th among 34 OECD member nations.26
Even a survey conducted by the Korean government’s own anti-corruption
body showed that 40.1% of businesspeople considered Korean society to be
corrupt.27 Thus, despite its reforms, Korea is still perceived to have high
levels of bribery and corruption.
In the past few years, there also have been a number of prominent
Korean corruption cases, indicating that “illicit business behavior” is still
pervasive in Korea.28 A prominent example is the recent nuclear corruption
scandal, which has received a great deal of media attention and public
scrutiny. In early 2014, a former top state utility official and several highranking executives29 of the state-run Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co.
Ltd. (KHNP)30 were convicted on charges of corruption and bribery over
forged safety certificates for replacement parts that were supplied to some
of the nation’s twenty-three nuclear reactors. The corruption scandal fueled
public anger, because the nation, which relies on those nuclear reactors for a
third of its energy, has faced a series of shutdowns of reactors due to the
falsified documents going back to 2012.31 As Reuters reported, the
gratitude or loyalty.” Ehrlich & Kang, supra note 14, at 4.
24
The Corruption Perceptions Index ranks countries and territories based on the perceived level of
public sector corruption. Corruption Perceptions Index 2013, TRANSPARENCY INT’L,
http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2013/results/#sthash.YHurWl7A.dpuf (last visited Jan. 23, 2014).
25
The Bribe Payers Index ranks the perception that nationals pay bribes abroad; a higher rank
indicates less perceived bribery.
Bribe Payers Index 2011, TRANSPARENCY INT’L,
http://www.transparency.org/bpi2011/results (last visited Apr. 12, 2015). By contrast, Korea did well in
other TI ranking categories. For example, the Global Competitive Index ranked Korea 26 out of 144.
Klaus Schwab, The Global Competitiveness Report 2014–2015, WORLD ECON. F.,
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalCompetitivenessReport_2014-15.pdf (last visited Apr. 12,
2015). Korea’s Human Development Index was also “very high,” placing 15 out of 187 nations. 2014
Human Development Report, UN DEV. PROGRAMME, https://data.undp.org/dataset/HDI-Indicators-ByCountry-2014/5tuc-d2a9 (last visited Apr. 12, 2015).
26
OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION IN KOREA
(2011), http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-briberyconvention/Koreaphase3reportEN.pdf.
27
44.3% of the general public responded that Korean society overall is corrupt, followed by experts
(37.0%), foreigners (15.3%), and public officials (15.1%). ACRC KOREA ANNUAL REPORT 2012,
http://www.acrc.go.kr/eng/board.do?command=searchDetail&method=searchDetail
ViewInc&menuId=020504&confId=64&conConfId=64&conTabId=0&currPageNo=1&boardNum=320
64 (last visited Aug. 8, 2014).
28
BUSINESS ANTI-CORRUPTION PORTAL, supra note 21.
29
Those include an executive at Korea Electric Power Corp (KEPCO) and a former top-ranking
executive at KHNP.
30
KHNP is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO), whose
major shareholders are the Korean government and other state-run corporations.
31
Meeyoung Cho, South Korea Should Lower Reliance On Nuclear: Study, REUTERS, Oct. 10,
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monopoly of the state-run KEPCO in the Korean nuclear industry has bred
“a culture of secrecy that led to corrupt practices among officials involved
in safety certification.”32 While awareness of and compliance with anticorruption laws are noticeably improving, this case, among many others,
suggests that the reforms have largely been ineffective to root out corrupt
practices deeply entrenched at all levels of Korean society.
II. KOREA’S ANTI-CORRUPTION LAWS
Corruption may indicate problems with the laws and legal system of
Korea, which may in turn create a problem for continued economic
development.33 Indeed, massive structural corruption in Korea’s ruling elite
undermined fair competition in the market and contributed significantly to
the economic and financial crisis of 1997.34 The Korean government has
since taken a more aggressive stance against corruption by revamping its
anti-bribery laws. Legal reform efforts, which began in 1998, sped up
following a series of corruption scandals in 2000 and 2001, culminated in
the enactment of three new anti-corruption laws in 2001.35
A. Laws Governing Domestic Bribery
Korea applies criminal sanctions with respect to corruption offences
such as bribery pursuant to (i) the Korean Criminal Code (Criminal
Code);36 (ii) the Act on Aggravation of Punishment of Specific Crimes
(Specific Crimes Act);37 and (iii) the Act on Aggravation of Punishment of
Specific Economic Crimes (Specific Economic Crimes Act).38 Under the
Criminal Code, public official bribery and private commercial bribery are

2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/13/us-energy-korea-nuclear-idUSBRE99C00Z20131013.
The country currently has twenty-three nuclear reactors, which generate over 20,000 MW of energy and
produce about one-third of the nation’s power. Of its twenty-three reactors, three still remain offline so
that cables supplied with fake certificates can be replaced. Taek-Rim (Terry) Oh et al., Legal Issues and
Trends in Enforcement of Anti-Corruption Legislation in Korea, SHIN & KIM (June 5, 2012),
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=c075a412-c0e5-45ee-aecb-5adcfd0bdc1d.
32
Cho, supra note 31.
33
Ehrlich & Kang, supra note 14, at 7; see also OECD, supra note 3 (“The significant impact of
corruption on income inequality and the negative effect of corruption on income growth for the poorest
20% of a country have been proven empirically.”).
34
Ehrlich & Kang, supra note 14, at 3.
35
For a comprehensive discussion of the corruption scandals in 2000s, see id.
36
Hyeongbeop [Criminal Code], Act No. 293, Sept. 18, 1953, amended by Act No. 7623, July 29,
2005, art. 335 (S. Kor.).
37
Teugjeong beomjoe beob [Specific Crimes Act], Act No. 1744, Feb. 23, 1966, amended by Act
No. 10210, Mar. 31, 2012 (S. Kor.).
38 38
Teugjeong gyeongje beomjoe beob [Specific Economic Crimes Act], Act No. 3693, Dec. 31,
1983 (S. Kor.).
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separate and distinct crimes, each prosecuted under different provisions of
the Criminal Code.39
In the public domain, bribery is one of the most common crimes in
Korea.40 Articles 129–132 of the Criminal Code specify that an act of
bribery will be established when a public official, in connection with his or
her duty, receives a bribe as consideration for performance.41 In this context
“public official” means any person or category of person recognized as such
under the State Public Officials Act and/or the Local Public Officials Act.
The Code of Conduct for Public Officials, the Public Service Ethics Act,
and the Act on the Disclosure of Information by Public Agencies have also
been adopted by the government to discourage bribery by public officials
from accepting bribes.42
In the private business context, a typical type of bribery is the “crime
of receiving or giving a bribe by breach of fiduciary duty” prescribed in
Article 357 of the Criminal Code.43 The difference between the elements of
private sector bribery and those of public sector bribery is that private sector
bribery requires an “unlawful solicitation” of favor in disregard of fair
competition (e.g., receiving a contract award in exchange for cash), which
is not necessarily required for public sector bribery.44 The Specific
Economic Crimes Act also expressly prohibits the giving of illicit economic
benefit to employees of financial institutions. A “financial institution”
includes both government-controlled as well as private financial institutions
including commercial banks, securities companies, among others.45
Punishment for public sector bribery in Korea is stated in (i) Article 2
of the Specific Crimes Act; and (ii) Article 129 of the Criminal Code: No
less than ten years to life imprisonment if the amount of the bribe is at least
KRW 50,000,000 (or approximately US$ 50,000); at least five years of
imprisonment if the amount of the bribe is more than KRW 10,000,000 (or
approximately US$ 10,000); and not more than five years for lesser

39

The determination of which bribery provisions of the Criminal Code apply depends on whether
the individual have accepted bribe would be deemed a “public official.” Articles 129–133 deal with
public officials and Article 357 deals with private sector corruption. The punishments are enhanced by
the Specific Crimes Act and Specific Economic Crimes Act. Act No. 293, arts. 129–33, 357 (S. Kor.).
40
NORTON
ROSE,
ANTI-CORRUPTION
LAWS
IN
ASIA
PACIFIC
(2012),
http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/files/anti-corruption-laws-in-asia-pacific-63559.pdf.
41
Act No. 293, arts. 129–32 (S. Kor.).
42
BUSINESS ANTI-CORRUPTION PORTAL, supra note 21.
43
Act No. 293, art. 357 (S. Kor.).
44
Act No. 293, art. 357 (S. Kor.); see also Kurt B. Gerstner and Hyun-Ah Kim, Anticorruption
Statute Violations: How to “Bet the Company” Without Even Trying, 56 NO. 7 DRI FOR DEF. 27 (July
2014) (explaining that, in the private context, “the lawfulness of the solicitation of business through giftgiving is decided by the courts after considering the general circumstances of the case and the relevant
facts surrounding the gift-giving, including . . . various other factors such as good faith, among others.”).
45
Act No. 3693, arts. 5–6 (S. Kor.).
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amounts.46 Article 357 of the Criminal Code defines the crime of private
sector bribery.47 The maximum period of imprisonment for a private sector
officer who has received a bribe is five years and the imposed fine may not
exceed KRW 10,000,000 (or approximately US$ 10,000).48 A bribe-giver
will be subject to imprisonment of up to two years or a fine up to KRW
5,000,000 (or approximately US$ 5,000).49
In 2001, the Anti-Corruption Act of Korea (Anti-Corruption Act) was
enacted with the stated purpose of “serving to create a clean climate of the
civil service and society by preventing and regulating the acts of corruption
efficiently.”50 The Anti-Corruption Act was amended by the Act on AntiCorruption and the Establishment and Operation of the Anti-Corruption &
Civil Rights Commission (the new Anti-Corruption Act).51 The new AntiCorruption Act established the Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights
Commission (ACRC), whose role is to improve administrative systems
pertaining to the processing of civil petitions for grievances and to assist in
the prevention and regulation of corrupt practices.52
B. Laws Governing the Bribery of Foreign Public Officials
The Act on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions (Foreign Public Officials Act) governs
the bribery of foreign public officials.53 The Foreign Public Officials Act,
enforced since it was enacted in 1998, was enacted to implement OECD
Anti-Bribery Convention to which Korea has been a party since 1997.54
Article 3 of the Foreign Public Officials Act provides criminal sanctions for
46

Act No. 293, art. 129 (S. Kor.); Act No. 1744, art. 2 (S. Kor.); see also Ehrlich & Kang, supra
note 14, at 33.
47
Act No. 293, art. 357 (S. Kor.).
48
Act No. 293, art. 357(1) (S. Kor.) (“A person who, administering another’s business, receives
property or obtains pecuniary advantage from a third person in response to an illegal solicitation
concerning his duty, shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than five years or by a fine not
exceeding ten million won.”).
49
Act No. 293, art. 357(2) (S. Kor.) (“A person who gives the property or pecuniary advantage as
specified in paragraph (1), shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than two years or by a fine
not exceeding five million won.”).
50
Act No. 6494, art. 1 (S. Kor.).
51
Act No. 8878 (S. Kor.).
52
Act No. 8878, art. 11 (S. Kor.).
53
Act No. 10178 (S. Kor.).
54
Currently, roughly forty countries have adopted the OECD Convention. Those nations account
for two-thirds of the world’s exports and ninety percent of foreign direct investment. OECD Convention
on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, Dec. 17, 1997,
37
I.L.M.
1
(entered
into
force
Feb.
15,
1999),
http://www.oecd.org/daf/antibribery/ConvCombatBribery_ENG.pdf [hereinafter OECD Bribery Convention]; see also FCPA
PROFESSOR BLOG, http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/fcpa-101#sthash.VNmwOrwY.dpuf/ (last visited Feb.
9, 2014).
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an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of payment of bribery.55
Under Article 4, not only the wrongdoer himself but also his employer or
the representative of the relevant company are also subject to penalties.56
Korea has also participated in other multilateral forums to combat
transnational corruption. It signed the United Nations Convention against
Corruption in 2003 and ratified it in 2008.57 Korea is also a party to the Asia
Pacific Economic Cooperation Anti-Corruption and Transparency Experts
Task Force (APEC ACT).58
C. Whistleblower-Related Provisions
Under the original Anti-Corruption Act and the new Anti-Corruption
Act, public officials are obligated to report acts of corruption by another
public official to any investigative agency, the Board of Audit and
Inspection, or the ACRC.59 The Reports Act and the Proceeds of Crimes
Act also impose reporting obligations on employees of financial institutions
and penalties for failing to report. However, these acts do not provide any
protection for the whistleblower.60 The most recent whistleblower-related
legislation, the Act on the Protection of Public Interest Whistleblowers
(Whistleblower Act),61 affords whistleblowers some level of protection in
both the public and private sectors and this protection equally extends to
reports on foreign bribery.62 Under Article 2 of the Whistleblower Act,
“whistleblowing” means “reporting, petitioning, informing, accusing or
complaining that a violation of the public interest has occurred or is likely
to occur” to an employer, the relevant administrative or investigative
agency, the ACRC or other designated person or entity in the
Whistleblower Act.63 A “violation of the public interest” means an act that
“infringes on the health and safety of the public, the environment, consumer
interests and fair competition,” or acts that are subject to criminal sanctions
or administrative action as defined in the Whistleblower Act.64

55

Act No. 10178, art. 3 (S. Kor.).
Id. art. 4.
57
United Nations Convention Against Corruption, G.A. Res. 58/4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/4 (Oct. 31,
2003); U.S. DEP’T ST., supra note 21.
58
U.S. DEP’T ST., supra note 21.
59
Act No. 6494, art. 26 (S. Kor.); Act No. 8878, art. 56 (S. Kor.).
60
See NORTON ROSE, supra note 40.
61
Act No. 10472 (S. Kor.).
62
Id. arts. 11–25. Specifically, the following articles deal with whistleblower protection: Article 12
(Confidentiality Obligation for Public Interest Whistleblower, etc.); Article 13 (Protection of Personal
Safety); Article 14 (Mitigation and Remission of Culpability, etc.); Article 15 (Prohibition of
Disadvantageous Measures).
63
Act No. 10472, art. 2 (S. Kor.).
64
Id.
56
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III. THE SHORTCOMINGS OF KOREA’S ANTI-CORRUPTION
LAWS
With such a history of scandal despite these laws, one must question
how effective Korea’s legal framework for dealing with corruption is. The
optimal enforcement theory described below provides an analytical
framework for assessing Korea’s current anti-bribery regime.
A. Analytical Framework: Optimal Enforcement Theory
Gary Becker’s optimal enforcement theory65 seeks to ascertain
economically efficient (i.e., optimal) levels of law enforcement efforts so as
to minimize the overall costs of crime and punishment to society.66 The
analysis begins with an offender who either chooses to comply with or
violate the law. The offender will commit an offense if the offender’s gain
G exceeds the expected penalty, which is equivalent to the perceived
certainty of punishment—in lay terms, the likelihood of being caught—P
times the perceived severity of punishment f.67 Thus, the offender commits
the crime when: G > Pf. This indicates that an increase in either P or f
would reduce the expected utility from an offense and would deter that
offense, since either the probability of being apprehended or the severity of
the punishment would increase.68
In addition, the offense causes external harm H to other members of
society.69 The net social damage D is the difference between H and G.70 The
variable O is used to determine the aggregate effects of the total number of
offenses, which can be expressed as: D(O) = H(O) - G(O).71
One must also consider the costs of law enforcement. Enforcement
costs such as expenditures spent on police, court personnel, prison guards,
buildings, and the like72 are denoted by C, which is a function of both the
supply of offenses—number of offenses—O, and the probability of
apprehension p, and is thus symbolized as C(p, O).73 This means that an
increase in either the probability of apprehension or the number of offenses
would thus increase the total enforcement cost C.74
65

See generally Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON.
169 (1968).
66
Jeffrey S. Parker, The Economics of Mens Rea, 79 VA. L. REV. 741, 749–54 (1993).
67
Becker, supra note 65, at 176–77.
68
Id. at 177.
69
Id. at 173.
70
Id.
71
Id. at 177.
72
Parker, supra note 66, at 750.
73
Id.
74
Id.
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Some punishments also generate a “deadweight” cost to society,
denoted by the variable b, to the extent that the punishment imposed on the
offender cannot be transferred to a socially productive use.75 The total
social loss from punishments can thus be defined as bpfO, since bf
represents the loss per offense punished, and pO is the number of offenses
punished.76
In aggregate, Becker’s model derives the total social loss from crime
and punishment by the following formula: L = D(O) + C(O, p) + bpfO.77
Under this equation, the total social loss (L) equals the sum of (i) the net
social damages (D); (ii) the enforcement costs (C); and (iii) the social loss
from punishments (bpfO).78
This Comment’s focus is to choose variants under the control of public
policy that could minimize the total social loss from crime and punishment.
Becker points to P and f, which are the certainty and severity of
punishment, as the social decision variables.79 By adjusting these variables
and observing how they affect the level of total social loss, one can define
the optimality conditions for P and f.80
B. The Optimal Enforcement Theory as Applied to Korea’s AntiCorruption Enforcement81
In applying the principles of Becker’s optimal enforcement theory to
Korea’s anti-bribery enforcement, increasing either the perceived certainty
(P) or severity of punishment (f) would decrease the incidence of bribery.
Assuming that the enforcement is carried out in a cost-effective manner, the
lower incidence of bribery would decrease the net social damage and would
diminish the total social loss from corruption.
In regards to the variable f—the severity of punishment—the
punishment for bribery presently available under Korean law appears to be
more than sufficient, because punishment for a public official who has
75

Id.
Id. at 750–51
77
Id. at 751.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
The analytical framework used in this section is indebted to the work of Daniel Y. Jun and his
article, Daniel Y. Jun, Bribery Among the Korean Elite: Putting an End to A Cultural Ritual and
Restoring Honor, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1071 (1996). While this Comment concurs with Jun’s
finding that the certainty of punishment should take priority over the harshness of punishment to
effectively combat bribery in Korea, this Comment argues that the best solution to achieve optimal level
of enforcement in Korea is by creating a regulatory framework that can most effectively elicit the two
sources of inside information (with a focus on improving the rate of detection), rather than by “pursuing
relatively larger cases of bribery under the special statutes” (with an emphasis on achieving a higher rate
of conviction). See generally id.
76
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received a bribe is no less than ten years to life imprisonment if the amount
of the bribe is higher than KRW 50,000,000.82 KRW 50,000,000, or
approximately US$ 50,000, is not an exorbitantly high threshold, as it is
about the average annual wage of public employees in Korea.83 Life
imprisonment is the maximum level of punishment available under Korean
law, apart from the death penalty, and any punishment “approaching this
extreme would be punitive.”84 While punishment for private sector bribery
is lower than that of public sector bribery, the level of punishment even for
private commercial bribery is higher, or at least similar, when compared
with other countries’ anti-corruption statutes. Thus, the certainty of
punishment (P), versus the harshness of punishment (f), is the critical factor
that ought to be manipulated to achieve efficiency in Korean anti-bribery
enforcement.85
Further, studies have found that harsher penalties do not necessarily
lead to higher deterrence, whereas an increase in the certainty of
punishment could achieve a higher deterrent effect. It is also important to
remember that an increase in the probability of apprehension and conviction
raises the cost of law enforcement, which in turn raises the social cost of
crimes. Thus, to attain optimal enforcement, the cost of regulatory measures
should not be excessive. In other words, an ideal regulatory framework for
Korea is one that deters acts of bribery by raising the perceived certainty of
punishment, while doing so in a cost effective matter.
C. Korean Law is Insufficient to Attract Inside Information
1. Low Incentives for Self-Reporting by Wrongdoers
The challenge is that detection of bribery is inherently difficult
because the crime is naturally self-concealing.86 Thus, regulators heavily
rely on inside information for the detection of these cases.87 However,
Korean law does not provide sufficient incentives for insiders to come
forward with information that could aid prosecutors in detecting bribery.
Cooperation or self-disclosure may be a potential mitigating factor subject
82

Act No. 293, art. 129 (S. Kor.); Act No. 1744, art. 2 (S. Kor.).
KOREA
MINISTRY
OF
SECURITY
AND
PUBIC
ADMINISTRATION
(MOSPA),
http://www.mospa.go.kr/frt/a01/frtMain.do; see also Gong mu won Pyung guen yon bong 5200 . . . bak
bong eun yet mal [Average annual income for civil servant $52,200 . . . low salary is a thing of the past]
, DAILY TOMORROW (Apr. 19, 2013), http://www.dailytw.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=6518.
84
Jun, supra note 81, at 1105. In Korea, the last execution took place on December 1997; there is a
moratorium on state-sanctioned executions in Korea. AMNESTY INT’L, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL
REPORT 2013 162–164 (2013) (on file with author).
85
Jun, supra note 81, at 1106.
86
Leslie, supra note 7, at 180.
87
Rose-Ackerman, supra note 8, at 222.
83
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to the prosecution’s sole discretion, but there are no clear written guidelines
to fetter the exercise of that discretion in Korean law.88
Instead, Korean anti-bribery laws impose an affirmative duty to selfreport.89 There are two problems with this approach. First, this obligation
only applies to public officials—the bribe receivers—meaning that it
attempts to tackle the problem only from the demand side, omitting
treatment of the supply side of bribery. Second, even if the duty extended
both ways, a company or an individual who has violated the law is already
breaking the law—it is unrealistic to expect an offender to feel a great
pressure to abide by the self-report provision when he or she is already
willing to violate other provisions of the statute with more serious
consequences. It is concerns of this sort that have led marginal deterrence
theory, which states that punishments for multiple or more severe crimes
should be punished more severely than single or less severe crimes. The
goal is to encourage criminals to limit their criminal acts, including acts
intended to cover up other crimes.90
2. Low Incentives for Potential Whistleblowers
The Anti-Corruption Act allows “any citizen to file a complaint with
the commission,91 obligates a public official to do so,92 protects
whistleblowers by protecting their identity and job security,93 provides
monetary rewards to persons who inform the government of corrupt
88

Hyungkwan Park, The Basic Features of the First Korean Sentencing Guidelines, 22 FED.
SENT’G REP. 262, 262–71 (2010) (“Korea has encountered problems in sentencing such as leniency,
disparity, and instances where sentencing was not based on clear and sound reasoning . . . . [T]he
comparatively broad nature of statutory sentencing ranges of major crimes allows for considerable
discretion.”); see also Young-Chul Kim, The Effective System Of Criminal Investigation And
Prosecution In Korea, in ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2001 AND RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES NO. 60 77
(2003), http://www.unafei.or.jp/english/pdf/RS_No60/No60_00All.pdf
89
By contrast, under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, corporations and individuals do not
have an affirmative duty to self-report. In the United States, individuals have Fifth Amendment rights
against self-incrimination. Corporations, on the other hand, do not have Fifth Amendment rights per se,
but they also do not have an affirmative duty to incriminate themselves. O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP,
FCPA HANDBOOK 91 (6th ed. 2009), http://www.omm.com/files/upload/OMelvenyMyers_
Sixth_Edition_FCPA_Handbook.pdf. However, this does not mean that a corporation has unfettered
discretion as to whether to self-report crimes of their employees that they have become aware of. The
board of directors, for example, has fiduciary duties of care and loyalty under state law to the
corporation and its constituencies. Robert W. Tarun & Peter P. Tomczak, A Proposal for A United States
Department of Justice Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Leniency Policy, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 153, 188
(2010).
90
For a comprehensive overview of the marginal deterrence theory, see Steven Shavell, A Note on
Marginal Deterrence, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 345 (1992).
91
Act No. 6494, art. 25 (S. Kor).
92
Id. art. 26.
93
Id. arts. 32, 49.
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behavior,”94 and affords leniency to those who provided information to the
government that leads to detection of misconduct.95
However, the efficacy of these whistleblower provisions is in serious
doubt. There are several reasons. First, the cap on monetary rewards for
whistleblowers—the “whistleblower bounty”—is far too low to elicit
knowledgeable whistleblowers to come forward especially in large
corruption cases. The new Anti-Corruption Act provides monetary rewards
to whistleblowers in accordance with the Awards and Decorations Act,
etc.,96 if the information leads to “recovering or increasing revenues or
cutting down costs of a public institution.”97 But the financial reward cannot
exceed KRW 100,000,000 (approximately US$ 100,000).98 This is absurdly
low given that many corruption cases in Korea involve millions and billions
of dollars of bribe money.99 Unless substantially larger rewards are made
available to whistleblowers, it is unrealistic to expect anyone to come
forward in cases involving large corporations or high-ranking government
officials, where the whistleblower risks “the potentially life-altering
consequences” of reporting corruption.100
Second, Korean discovery laws make it difficult to gather enough
evidence to survive a motion to dismiss, which discourages potential
whistleblowers from coming forward. While NGOs have largely taken the
lead in reporting business corruption and bribery in Korea, virtually none of
them have been able to offer enough proof in court to survive a motion to
dismiss, as it is inherently difficult for outsiders to access companies’
internal documents and reveal misconduct.101
Third, empirical evidence suggests that maintaining the anonymity of
whistleblowers is an “essential prerequisite to safeguard confidentiality and
to encourage healthy whistleblowing behaviors.”102 However, Korean law
does not guarantee anonymity to whistleblowers. The Whistleblower Act
requires a whistleblower to document his or her name, resident registration
94

Id. art. 36; Ehrlich & Kang, supra note 14, at 44.
Act No. 6494, art. 35 (S. Kor.).
96
Act No. 11690 (S. Kor.).
97
Act No. 10178, art 36 (S. Kor.).
98
Boheom bijeuniseu beoblyul sihaenglyeong [Enforcement Decree of the Insurance Business
Act], Presidential Decree No. 24097, Sep. 7, 2012, art. 22 (S. Kor.).
99
See supra notes 18–19 and accompanying text.
100
Aaron R. Petty, How Qui Tam Actions Could Fight Public Corruption, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
851, 878 (2006).
101
See, e.g., Kim, Je Sun, Roles of Korean NGOs in the Battle Against Corruption, 3 KOREAN J.
SOC. ISSUES 1, 245 (2003), http://www.ksrc.or.kr/~socialissues/content/vol_7/ss7_kjs.pdf; Sung-soo
Joo, 20 years of ‘NGO revolution’ Reshapes Society, KOREA HERALD (July 20, 2007, 10:02 AM),
http://news.naver.com/main/read.nhn?mode=LSD&mid=sec&sid1=001&oid=044&aid=0000066140.
102
Rachel Beller, Whistleblower Protection Legislation of the East and West: Can It Really Reduce
Corporate Fraud and Improve Corporate Governance? A Study of the Successes and Failures of
Whistleblower Protection Legislation in the US and China, 7 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 873, 927 (2011).
95
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number, address, and occupation when reporting a corruption case to the
government authorities, making it impossible for the whistleblower to
submit a tip anonymously.103 Under certain circumstances, the
Whistleblower Act does guarantee confidentiality and protection of
personal safety to whistleblowers, but to take advantage of such protection,
they must first prove that retaliation for whistleblowing activities is highly
likely and that they or their relatives are likely to suffer serious danger.104 In
addition to the lack of anonymity and accompanying protection,
whistleblowers also have to worry about punishment for allegedly making a
false accusation—all of the whistleblower-related statutes provide for
punishment of persons who make a false accusation.105
Finally, because many in Korean society still tend to view
whistleblowers as traitors who betrayed their employers, colleagues, and
friends, it is not clear that these protections are sufficient in the Korean
context, despite their use in the U.S.106 Korea’s “strong culture of group
loyalty” serves to reinforce the perception that reporting one’s friend or
employer is morally repugnant.107
As mentioned above, focusing on the certainty of punishment is key in
Korea for optimal enforcement of its anti-corruption laws. From this
perspective, it becomes clear that Korea’s current legal regime is
103

Gong-gong-ui iig gija beob-ui boho [Protection of Public Interest Reporters Act], Act No.10472,
Mar. 29, 2011, art. 8 (S. Kor.) (“Any person who intends to file a public interest whistleblowing case
shall submit in writing . . . a statement . . . that includes the information described in each of the
following Subparagraphs: 1. The name, resident registration number, address, contact numbers, etc. of
the whistleblower; 2. The name of the person who violated public interest; 3. A factual description of the
violation of the public interest; 4. The purport and reason of the public interest whistleblowing.”).
104
Article 12 (Confidentiality Obligation for Public Interest Whistleblower, etc.)
(1) No person with the knowledge of the fact that someone is a public interest
whistleblower, etc., shall tell, disclose to or publicize to any third party personal
information concerning the public interest whistleblower, etc., or other facts that
infer the identity of the public interest whistleblower, etc. However, this provision
shall not apply provided that the public interest whistleblower, etc., gives his/her
consent to the revelation of such information. Act No.10472, Mar. 29, 2011, art.
12; Article 13 (Protection of Personal Safety) (1) The public interest
whistleblower, etc., his/her relatives or cohabitants may request the Commission
to take protective measures for their personal safety (hereinafter referred to as
“personal protection measures”) in the event that the public interest
whistleblower, etc., his/her relatives or cohabitants have faced or are likely to face
serious danger to their lives or persons. In such an event, the Commission may, if
deemed necessary, request the chief of the police station or agency to provide the
necessary personal protection measures.
Act No.10472, art. 13 (S. Kor.).
105
ACRC REPORT, supra note 9, at 62.
106
Ehrlich & Kang, supra note 17, at 22 (explaining that “due to Confucian influence . . . seniors
and elders are to be respected without question, it would be difficult for staff members to challenge a
CEO’s decision.”).
107
Kim, supra note 17, at 315; Ehrlich & Kang, supra note 17, at 22.
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insufficient to incentivize the two primary sources of inside information—
self-reporting by wrongdoers and whistleblowing—reducing the perceived
risk of detection in the eyes of criminals.
IV. CREATING A “CARROTS AND STICKS” FRAMEWORK FOR
OPTIMAL ENFORCEMENT OF KOREA’S ANTI-CORRUPTION
LAWS
This Comment proposes that optimal enforcement of Korean antibribery laws can be achieved by adopting two regulatory tools that have
proven very successful in the detection and deterrence of complex whitecollar crimes in the United States: (i) The DOJ’s Antitrust Amnesty
Program, and (ii) The FCA’s Qui Tam Private Enforcement Model.108
The expected benefit of this new legal framework is two-fold. First, it
would provide sufficient incentives to effectively attract both sources of
inside information—self-reporting wrongdoers and whistleblowers—while
doing so in cost-effective ways. Second, the adoption of these features
would establish a “carrots and sticks” regulatory framework which
encourages compliance. A prudent course to take would be to combine the
two proposals because, individually, both have drawbacks. From a practical
standpoint, the combination of the two proposals (labeled carrots and sticks,
respectively) strikes a good balance that would satisfy all interested
parties—businesses should welcome this change, as the amnesty program
would allow them to take advantage of this “carrot.” This change also
imparts significant benefits to the general public, as the qui tam privatepublic partnership model will serve as the “stick,” reinforcing public
regulatory efforts, thus increasing awareness of and compliance with the
Korean anti-corruption laws.

108

No scholarship has yet examined the applicability of an anti-bribery regulatory scheme (whether
in the United States or in Korea) incorporating both of these enforcement tools. A number of authors
have identified these programs separately as suitable models for improving regulatory efforts, but in
varying degrees and in different contexts. For example, some scholars have advocated for an antibribery leniency program in the context of the FCPA, a U.S. foreign anti-bribery statute. See, e.g., Tarun
& Tomczak, supra note 89. Some authors have proposed that either (i) international law; (ii) the FCPA;
or (iii) U.S. domestic anti-corruption laws should be amended to include a qui tam provision. See Paul
D. Carrington, Qui Tam: Is False Claims Law A Model for International Law?, 2012 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
27 (2012); Nathaniel Garrett, Dodd-Frank’s Whistleblower Provision Fails to Go Far Enough: Making
the Case for A Qui Tam Provision in A Revised Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 765
(2012); Petty, supra note 100. Others have asserted more broadly that the private sector needs to be
more effectively utilized in the fight against corruption. See, e.g., Bucy, supra note 8. While this
Comment owes much to the work of these scholars, the Comment argues for a combination of the two
proposals into a more balanced enforcement approach (i.e., the “carrots and sticks” regulatory
framework). Combining the two proposals would also have the benefit of eliciting not just one, but both
of the information sources that have been critical for detection and deterrence of bribery cases in Korea.

252

36_1_5_SANGBECK

KIM SUPERFINAL.docx (DO NOT DELETE)

1/28/16 11:33 AM

Korea’s Anti-Corruption Efforts
36:235 (2016)

A. Increasing Incentives for Voluntary Disclosure
1. The U.S. Experience
The Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division has, through its
Corporate and Individual Amnesty Program, “achieved an enviable record
in securing landmark fines and motivating corporations and individuals to
disclose illegal anti-competitive conduct to and cooperate early with U.S.
law enforcement authorities.”109 To overcome obstacles with detection
inherently difficult in antitrust cases (e.g., price-fixing schemes), regulators
generally rely on a “combination of self-disclosure and voluntary
cooperation by individual firms, backed up with promises of leniency.”110
The current antitrust amnesty program succeeds in large part because it
“creates distrust among cartel participants.”111 The “rewards structure” of
the program “creates a race to confess,” and the “trigger that starts the race
is distrust.”112 As only the first company to qualify receives amnesty, it puts
enormous pressure on each participant to hurry to confess.113 The Division
“frequently encounters situations where a company approaches the
government within days and in some cases less than one business day, after
one of its co-conspirators has secured its position as first in line for
amnesty.”114
2. An Anti-Corruption Amnesty Program in the Korean Context
Leniency programs are uniquely designed to fight self-concealing
white-collar crimes. To detect and prosecute more bribery cases, the Korean
government may look for inspiration from the proven U.S. Antitrust
Amnesty Program. Because the crimes of price fixing and bribery share
some important commonalities,115 the success of Antitrust Amnesty
Program can likely be replicated in the context of bribery. In fact,
incorporating a leniency program as part of a regulatory scheme is not
something new to Korean regulators—Korea’s antitrust leniency program,
109

Tarun & Tomczak, supra note 89, at 236.
Joseph W. Yockey, Choosing Governance in the FCPA Reform Debate, 38 J. CORP. L. 325, 348
(2013).
111
Leslie, supra note 7, at 172–73.
112
Id.
113
Id. at 173–74.
114
Id. at 172–73.
115
Both bribery and cartel cases are inherently difficult to prove and require an insider willing to
cooperate. Also, cartels and bribery are both conspiracies, meaning that there are always other remaining
companies/individuals left to prosecute after the first one reports the conduct. And most important, both
price-fixing conspiracies and anti-bribery violations “are white-collar crimes that are hard to detect.” Id.
at 175.
110
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modeled after that of the United States, has proven very effective in
uncovering antitrust violations in Korea.116
Potential benefits of a new anti-corruption amnesty program in Korea
are as follows:
(a) Cost-Effective Enforcement
Enforcement of white-collar crime can be costly both monetarily and
in terms of personnel.117 Thus, giving corporations an incentive to selfreport corruption saves money and effort that might otherwise be spent in
identifying wrongdoers.118 Given that the vast majority of prosecutors in
Korea are overworked and understaffed,119 leveraging the resources of
private entities that may have “first-hand information about potential
violations” would be particularly crucial to save on enforcement costs in
Korea. 120
(b) Predictable and Calculable Benefits
Under Korean law, cooperation or self-disclosure may be a potential
mitigating factor subject to the prosecution’s sole discretion, but there are
no clear written guidelines to fetter the exercise of that discretion.121 This is
problematic—if law enforcement policies are “not transparent and
116

For a comprehensive analysis of and statistics on the numbers and fines of total cartel cases and
leniency filed cases, see Yung Jeong Choi, An Empirical Analysis of the Corporate Leniency Program
in
Korea:
Its
Amendments
in
2005,
18
KOR.
J.
ECON.
255
(2011),
http://yeri.yonsei.ac.kr/new/kje_data/2011/vol2/2011vol201.pdf. Korea also operates leniency programs
in other areas of law (e.g., local and municipal laws involving petty offenses). But these do not create a
race among participants: they simply offer a reduction in fines for self-reporting petty offenses.
117
Kevin Davis, Does the Globalization of Anti-corruption Law Help Developing Countries? 9
(NYU Center for L. Econ. Organization, Working Paper No. 09-52, 2009), http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1520553.
118
Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Optimal Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting of Behavior, 102
J. POL. ECON. 583, 584 (1994).
119
According to the Legal Profession Happiness Index Survey conducted by a major Korean legal
journal in 2006, 87% of the prosecutors surveyed responded that they are on average working more than
10 hours per day. The results also showed that 96% of the prosecutors work during weekends and
holidays, with 41% of them responding more than 5 times per month on average. Tae-kyung Yeo, Bup
jo in hang bok ji su sul mun jo sa [Survey on happiness of legal professionals], LAWTIMES, Dec. 4,
2006, https://www.lawtimes.co.kr/Legal-Opinion/Legal-Opinion-View?Serial=23237&kind=AF&key=;
see also Go-woon Lee, Lo pum gat da com back han gum sa “ya gun eu chu uk gu ri wot da”
[Prosecutor who returned to prosecution after private practice in law firm “I missed pulling all-nighter”]
HANKYUNG, Nov. 23, 2011, http://www.hankyung.com/news/app/newsview.php?aid=2011112392831.
120
Mary Schapiro, Chairman, SEC, Remarks at the SEC Open Meeting: Establishing a
Whistleblower Program (May 25, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-116.htm (“[F]or an
agency with limited resources . . . it is critical to be able to leverage the resources of people who may
have first-hand information about potential violations.”).
121
Park, supra note 88; see also Kim, supra note 88.
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predictable,” then companies are “less able to weigh the costs and benefits
of disclosing misconduct” to the government.122 However, if those policies
present and promote “clear and predictable benefits from disclosure” that
reduce risks to companies, then more corporations will cooperate and
embrace stronger anti-corruption compliance governance principles.123 In
this regard, the U.S. Antitrust Amnesty Program provides clear and
predictable policies that have informed directors and in-house counsels of
the risk of detection and the specific rewards of self-disclosures and full
cooperation.124 Thus, the proposed anti-corruption leniency policy may
provide Korean corporations with “greater certainty and predictability”
regarding the benefits of self-reporting misconduct, thus affecting their
decision-making regarding such reports.125
(c) Counterarguments to a New Anti-Corruption Amnesty Program
Some argue that it would be difficult to create a race for amnesty in the
bribery context because fundamental differences remain between pricefixing cartels and corruption. The argument goes as follows: First, while the
briber and the bribed often share a “trusting relationship,” cartel members in
a price-fixing conspiracy are “natural adversaries who distrust each
other.”126 The U.S. Antitrust Amnesty Program succeeds by exploiting the
“natural distrust” among a cartel’s members, as they often have an intrinsic
tendency to distrust each other.127 From this perspective, so the argument
goes, it is unclear how an anti-corruption amnesty policy can create distrust
among bribery coconspirators who are essentially “natural allies.”128
Second, the scale of participation is different between cartelization and
corruption.129 In price-fixing, the larger number of conspirators can help an
amnesty program be effective.130 In contrast, bribery involves fewer parties,
namely the briber and the bribed.131 If only two parties are involved, there is
less reason for each to confess if they think the other has already done so.132
122

Tarun & Tomczak, supra note 89, at 155–56.
Id.
124
Id. at 236.
125
Id. at 214–215.
126
Leslie, supra note 7, at 176.
127
Id. at 177.
128
Id. at 178 (“The confessor in the antitrust conspiracy receives not only the benefit of amnesty, but
also the benefit of injuring her competitor, who will be liable for criminal penalties and treble damages
in the likely event of follow-on private lawsuits. In contrast, the briber is not better off betraying the
bribed because this will hurt the briber’s ability to get contracts from that entity in the future. In sum,
participants in bribery schemes would not seem as inclined to betray their partners in crime.”).
129
Id. at 176.
130
Id. at 178.
131
Id. at 179.
132
Id.
123
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The above argument, however, overlooks the reality that a significant
percentage of anti-bribery violations involve “agents, suppliers,
representatives, distributors, and joint venture partners, among many others,
who are coconspirators in the bribery scheme.”133 Thus, a race for amnesty
is created not just between two parties, but among the bribe-payer, the
bribe-taker, and various third parties.
One may also argue that an anti-corruption amnesty program may give
offenders unlimited opportunities to obtain a reduction in sentencing or
exemption from conviction. One easy solution for this would be to prohibit
repeat offenders who previously engaged in corruption from receiving
additional leniency benefits within a specified period (e.g., a provision
something along the lines of “Repeated offender shall not receive additional
leniency benefits within five years from the date of its initial leniency
application”). This would also force companies to strengthen their internal
compliance procedures to prevent and avoid corrupt practices well in
advance.
B. Increasing Incentives for Whistleblowers with Insider Information
As noted earlier, whistleblowers are precious sources of inside
information when it comes to enforcing self-concealing crimes, such as acts
of bribery. Bucy argues that information that they provide “is an invaluable
commodity that the regulatory world must pay for.”134 This commodity
“must be priced high enough to overcome the disincentives to providing it
and to alter existing personal and societal values against providing it.”135
Indeed, in Korea (as in many countries) there have been individuals
involved in major corruption investigations in the past that could have come
forward with material information but chose to not do so. Thus, the law
should be designed in a way that could provide a sufficient incentive for
these people to come forward and provide aid to the government at an
earlier stage of investigation.136
The first part of this section introduces different regulatory models
providing whistleblower incentives and protections in the United States,
noting that the FCA’s private-public partnership model137 is the best at
encouraging people with inside information about violations to come
forward and be a whistleblower.

133

FCPA PROFESSOR BLOG, supra note 54.
Bucy, supra note 8, at 8 (emphasis added).
135
Id.
136
See Petty, supra note 100, at 863.
137
See infra text accompanying notes 159–164.
134
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1. The U.S. Experience
(a) The Bounty System—The SEC’s Whistleblower Incentives and
Protection Program138
The SEC’s Whistleblower Incentives and Protection Program,
established under the Dodd-Frank Act,139 provides substantial
whistleblower rewards to individuals who provide new information to the
SEC that leads to the successful prosecution of securities law violations,
including Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)140 violations.141 Under this
program, individuals may receive a bounty between ten and thirty percent,
if they provide information that results in monetary sanctions exceeding $1
million.142
Legislative history shows that the U.S. Congress created the
whistleblower provision to “motivate those with inside knowledge to come
forward and assist the government to identify and prosecute persons who
have violated securities laws and recovery money for victims of financial
fraud.”143 The U.S. Senate Report notes that “[w]histleblower tips were 13
times more effective than external audits” in detecting fraud schemes in
public companies.144 The statute also includes an anti-retaliation provision
that prohibits employers from taking retaliatory actions against a
whistleblower.145
The SEC Whistleblower Program “rests on sound principles in that it
recognizes the importance of including private citizens in detecting
financial crimes.”146 Under this scheme, however, whistleblowers’ role is
limited to serving as “mere informants.”147

138

Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §922, 124 Stat. 1376, 1841-49 (2010) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §78u-6). Definition of whistleblower is in 15 U.S.C. §78u-6(a)(6).
139
Id.
140
The FCPA prohibits corruptly offering or giving anything of value to a foreign official for the
purpose of obtaining or business, or otherwise influencing that official’s decision-making ability.
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd-1 to -3, 78ff (2006)).
141
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(A)(1).
142
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b)(1).
143
S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 110 (2010).
144
Id.
145
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h). This provision gives whistleblowers a cause of action and jurisdiction in
federal district court.
146
Garrett, supra note 108, at 767 (emphasis added).
147
For a comprehensive discussion of the shortcomings of the SEC’s Whistleblower Program, see
id.
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(b) Citizen Suit Regulatory Model
In the United States, private citizen participation in public enforcement
can also take the form of what one scholar characterizes as the “citizen suit
regulatory model.”148 In this model, individuals can bring a case under the
“private rights of action provisions” which exist in over twenty U.S.
environmental or consumer protection statutes.149 A typical private right of
action provision provides that “any person may commence a civil action . . .
against any person . . . who is alleged to be in violation of any permit,
standard, regulation, condition, requirement, prohibition, or order . . . .”150
This model has had some marginal success in aiding public enforcement
activities by “providing needed resources, deterring future violations, and
bringing unknown violations to the government’s attention.”151 The
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) acknowledges the contributions
made by such citizen suits.152 According to the EPA, citizen suit authority
“has served to leverage our scarce enforcement resources.”153 The agency
also notes that a greater deterrent effect is achieved by citizen suits “as
regulatees seek to achieve compliance to avoid not only federal and state
prosecution but also to avoid independent citizen actions.”154
Despite these successes, however, citizen suits ultimately fail as
effective supplements to government enforcement because they (i) do not
sufficiently coordinate public and private efforts at prosecution, and (ii) do
not offer enough incentives for lawyers to represent plaintiffs in citizen
suits.155 More significantly, the citizen suit regulatory model “does not offer
enough of a financial reward to entice knowledgeable whistleblowers to
come forward.”156 It also has the “potential to mightily disrupt existing
economic markets,” because it lacks a mechanism to monitor the quality of
the information provided by whistleblowers.157 Another huge problem with
such private right of action provisions is that they do not limit standing to
sue to original source or knowledgeable insider, thus attracting large
volumes of frivolous and opportunistic claims.158
148

Bucy, supra note 8, at 32.
Id.
150
Id.
151
Id. at 41.
152
Id.
153
U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, ENFORCEMENT IN THE 1990'S PROJECT: RECOMMENDATIONS
OF THE ANALYTICAL WORKGROUPS 5–48 (1991).
154
Id.
155
Bucy, supra note 8, at 60.
156
Id. at 11 n.36.
157
Id. at 6 (emphasis added).
158
As a side note, neither the Korean anti-bribery laws nor the U.S. FCPA recognizes a private right
of action. FCPA PROFESSOR BLOG, supra note 54 (“It is an open question whether Congress intended
for the FCPA to have a private right of action. However, various courts including the Sixth Circuit in
149
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(c) Qui Tam Action—The FCA’s Public-Private Partnership Model
The FCA is widely regarded as the United States’ “most effective
whistleblower law in history.”159 The FCA contains qui tam, or
whistleblower, provisions that allow for a private individual160 with
knowledge of fraud against the U.S. government to bring a suit on its
behalf.161 Whistleblowers can recover fifteen to twenty-five percent of the
settlement or judgment if the DOJ participates and thirty percent if the DOJ
declines to intervene.
The FCA has had, by far, the most success in making whistleblowers
come forward with inside information.162 The reason why the qui tam
provision in the FCA has been so effective in detecting and uncovering
fraud is because of its unique mechanism that uses a “rogue to catch a
rogue,” i.e., “using someone on the inside of the illegal act to turn on his
cohorts and provide information relating to the illegal act to the
enforcement agency.”163 Bucy notes that the FCA ultimately succeeds
because it “recognizes that inside information of wrongdoing is a valuable
commodity in regulatory efforts, that there are significant disincentives in
Lamb v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 915 F.2d 1024 (6th Cir. 1980), have held that the FCPA does not confer a
private right of action meaning that only the DOJ and SEC can bring FCPA cases.”). It has been argued,
however, that the FCPA would be more effective if it was amended to include a private right of action.
See, e.g., Ethan S. Burger & Mary S. Holland, Why the Private Sector Is Likely to Lead the Next Stage in
the Global Fight Against Corruption, 30 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 45, 53 (2006).
159
The False Claims Act (FCA) is the U.S. government’s primary litigation tool for combating
fraud. It imposes civil penalties of $5,500 to $11,000 per claim, plus treble damages (i.e., 3 times the
amount of the government’s damages). False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562,
100 Stat 3153 (codified as amended at 31 USC § 3729 et seq. (2006)). In year 2014, the federal
government recouped a record $5.69 billion in fraud lawsuits and investigations. Press Release, The
Department of Justice, Justice Department Recovers Nearly $6 Billion from False Claims Act Cases in
Fiscal Year 2014 (Nov. 20, 2014); see also TOM DEVINE & SHELLEY WALDEN, INTERNATIONAL BEST
PRACTICES FOR WHISTLEBLOWER POLICIES (2013), http://www.whistleblower.org/storage/documents/
Best_Practices_Document_for_website_March_13_2013.pdf (explaining that the statute increased “civil
fraud recoveries in government contracts from $27 million annually in 1985, to over $20 billion since,
including more than one billion dollars annually since 2000”).
160
These individuals are referred to as “qui tam relators” or “private attorneys general.” See
generally William B. Rubenstein, On What a “Private Attorney General” Is—and Why It Matters, 57
VAND. L. REV. 2129 (2004).
161
U.S.C. § 3729 et seq.
162
31 U.S.C. § 3730(d); see generally CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40785, QUI
TAM: THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT AND RELATED FEDERAL STATUTES (2013); David Freeman Engstrom,
Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: Empirical Analysis of DOJ Oversight of Qui Tam Litigation
Under the False Claims Act, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1689 (2013); see also Dennis J. Ventry, Jr.,
Whistleblowers and Qui Tam for Tax, 61 Tax L. 357, 382 (2008) (arguing that whistleblowers “are in a
unique position to deter and detect noncompliant behavior,” and “qui tam provision allows
whistleblowers to utilize their unique position to enforce the law”).
163
Garrett, supra note 108, at 786; see also Daniel K Tarullo, The Limits of Institutional Design:
Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 665, 689 (2004) (“Bribery takes
place in the shadows. It may never be visible to anyone but the immediate actors.”).
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coming forward with such information, and that the regulatory world must
offer adequate inducement to overcome these disincentives.”164
It is also important to note that qui tam actions are actually more
equitable for defendants. By contrast to the citizen suit regulatory model
described above, the FCA’s qui tam enforcement model grants the
government with expansive gatekeeper powers, effectively filtering out
opportunistic and frivolous lawsuits. When a qui tam relator brings a
lawsuit, the relator is required to do so under seal for a certain period of
time and to report their evidence against the defendant to the authorities.165
While the matter remains under seal, the government may investigate the
allegations to determine if it should intervene as an additional plaintiff, take
primary control over the case (limiting the relator’s involvement if
necessary) or even seek dismissal of the case.166 This “initial secrecy”
surrounding qui tam cases and the guarantee of confidentiality while
documents are under seal with the government help to protect defendants
from unwarranted reputational damage.167
Qui tam actions can also themselves increase deterrence: “Public
officials may be deterred from committing illegal activity because of the
increased likelihood that one of his co-conspirators will “sell him out” as a
result of the incentives offered under the qui tam provisions.”168
Most importantly, qui tam actions could lead to greater detection and
prosecution of other low-visibility crimes, such as bribery.169 In fact, a
number of scholars have advocated for a qui tam provision in the FCPA, a
U.S. foreign bribery statute, noting how such provision in the statute could
“achieve success on par” with the FCA as the crimes addressed by both
laws—fraud and bribery—are similar.170
Thus, of the three ways of giving incentives to whistleblowers
discussed—the bounty program, citizen suits, and qui tam actions—qui tam
actions provide the strongest regulatory model.
164

Bucy, supra note 8, at 61 (emphasis added).
Id. at 70.
166
Id.
167
Id.
168
Petty, supra note 100, at 875.
169
Garrett, supra note 108, at 786.
170
Id. U.S. Congress considered including a Qui Tam provision in the FCPA:
Dodd-Frank . . . ordered the SEC’s Inspector General to conduct a study to
determine whether that program should be built out into a full-on qui tam regime
that vests whistleblowers who have already tried to pursue the case via the
Commission with a private right of action . . . . Published in early 2013, the Office
of Inspector General’s report did not rule out a qui tam approach, noting the need
for further study. Importantly, Congress’s possible interest in bringing qui tam to
Dodd-Frank may be a bellwether: in an era of deepening fiscal austerity, private
enforcement should be an increasingly attractive alternative to traditional—and
on-budget—regulatory mechanisms.
Engstrom, supra note 162, at 1750–51.
165
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2. An Anti-Corruption Qui Tam Provision in the Korean Context
Potential benefits of a new anti-corruption qui tam provision in Korea
are as follows:
(a) Substantial Incentives for Whistleblowers to Come Forward
The most important benefit of a qui tam provision is the large
recoveries available to private plaintiffs through statutorily mandated
percentages of large, fixed penalties allocated for the qui tam relator.171 The
U.S. FCA experience shows that this is highly effective in attracting
knowledgeable insiders willing to serve as whistleblowers.172 As noted
earlier, plaintiffs take a substantial risk when bringing whistleblower cases.
U.S. Senator Grassley once said “[w]histleblowers frequently risk
everything when bringing false claim cases.”173 Thus, an anti-bribery qui
tam provision would be particularly effective in the Korean context:
Korea’s tight-knit, homogeneous society serves to reinforce the perception
that reporting on one’s friend or employer is morally repugnant.174 A
substantial inducement is required to overcome these disincentives, and the
qui tam action does exactly that.
(b) Encourages High Quality Information
Empirical evidence shows that, in a typical qui tam lawsuit,
government intervention leads to much higher success, though individual
plaintiffs (i.e., qui tam relators) can proceed on their own without
government intervention.175 Since plaintiffs know that government
intervention leads to much higher success, this induces plaintiff lawyers to
produce high-quality work.176 It should also be noted that the FCA qui tam
171

Bucy, supra note 8, at 53.
Id.
173
Petty, supra note 100, at 873; Medicaid Waste, Fraud and Abuse: Threatening the Health Care
Safety Net: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 109th Cong. 1 (2005) (statement of Sen. Charles
Grassley), http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/062905cgb.pdf.
174
Kim, supra note 17, at 315.
175
Bucy, supra note 8, at 51. According to a Bloomberg article, government intervention leads to
successful settlement in 98% of the cases pursued, whereas individual plaintiffs who continue with their
own lawsuits lose more than 95% of the time. Only about 20% of cases filed by individual plaintiffs are
joined by the government. David Voreacos & Margaret C. Fisk, AstraZeneca Case Rewards Two
Whistleblowers with $45 Million, BLOOMBERG (May 13, 2010, 11:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com
/news/articles/2010-05-12/astrazeneca-s-520-million-u-s-settlement-rewards-repeat-whistleblowers.
176
Bucy, supra note 8, at 51–52 (“The litigational advantages to private plaintiffs of obtaining DOJ
intervention are so substantial that the acknowledged goal of any experienced relators’ attorney is to
obtain the government’s intervention. Such intervention is obtained by preparing a thorough, complete,
and convincing written statement for the government.”).
172
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model effectively weeds out frivolous or parasitic claims through its FirstTo-File Bar provided in § 3730(b)(5).177
(c) Attracts Legal and Investigative Talent
In the past, NGOs mostly brought whistleblower cases in Korea. These
cases were done pro bono or by attorneys working for public interest
organizations with limited resources.178 The qui tam private justice model,
by comparison, “has proven to be highly effective in recruiting legal talent
who has the skill and resources to handle complex, expensive cases.”179
Because of the huge recoveries available to whistleblowers under the FCA
through statutorily mandated percentages of fixed penalties,180 these large
fees are a “significant incentive for top legal talent to undertake qui tam
plaintiffs’ work.”181
(d) Protects Defendants from Frivolous or Opportunistic Private
Lawsuits
There are concerns that qui tam actions yield parasitic and
opportunistic claims based on bare bones allegations, “whereby would-be
relators merely feed off a previous disclosure of fraud.”182 Admittedly, the
U.S. Congress was once concerned with the possibility of a flood of
frivolous and parasitic lawsuits pouring in in relation to the FCA.183 There
are several responses to this concern. First, the qui tam private justice
model contains a “dual-plaintiff mechanism” that allows for government
monitoring and control of private actions.184 This ensures that qui tam
actions serve “the public interest and that the private litigant proceeds
professionally, performing quality work.”185 Second, false reporting would
be further deterred in Korea, as it has a penal provision that provides for
177

Under the Civil Actions for the False Claims Act’s First-to-File rule, “when a person brings an
action . . . no person . . . may intervene or bring a related action based on the facts underlying the
pending action.” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5).
178
For examples of past whistleblower cases brought by public interest groups in Korea, see e.g.,
PEOPLE’S SOLIDARITY FOR PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY, http://www.peoplepower21.org/
Whistleblower/1050360#0; CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS NETWORK IN KOREA,
http://ti.or.kr/xe/eintro; TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL KOREA, http://www.civilnet.net/xe/.
179
Bucy, supra note 8, at 58.
180
Under the FCA, whistleblowers can recover fifteen to twenty-five percent of the settlement or
judgment if the DOJ participates, and thirty percent if the DOJ declines to intervene. See supra note 161
and accompanying text.
181
Bucy, supra note 8, at 58.
182
Walburn v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 431 F.3d 966, 970 (6th Cir. 2005).
183
See S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 2 (1986).
184
See supra notes 164–67, 175–77 and accompanying text.
185
Bucy, supra note 8, at 80.
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enhanced sanctions for frivolous lawsuits.186 Third, a corporate compliance
defense is available in Korean anti-bribery laws.187 Fourth, the Korean legal
system compels the losing side to pay attorney fees and litigation costs for
both parties.188 Thus a successful defendant would be entitled to impose the
costs of the defense on an unsuccessful plaintiff.189 This provision should
discourage cases that are frivolous or lack sufficient evidence.190 Finally,
defendants would also be able to take advantage of the proposed antibribery amnesty program outlined above.191
(e) Counterarguments to a New Anti-Bribery Qui Tam Provision
Opponents might argue that government oversight of qui tam actions
would lead to collusion between government regulators and industry. This
is a valid concern, given tightly knit relationships (which makes collusion
easier) between government and chaebols in Korea.192 But that argument
overlooks the fact that qui tam relators can proceed with their claim in court
without the government. In the FCA context, “although historically it has
been more difficult for relators to prevail when the DOJ does not intervene,
the relator can go forward with the case without the DOJ.”193 The amended
186

Act No. 6494, art. 49 (S. Kor.) (“If any person makes a whistle-blowing with knowledge that the
contents of his whistle-blowing are false as provided in Article 27, he shall be punishable by
imprisonment for not less than one year to not more than 10 years.”).
187
“[I]f the legal person has paid due attention or has exercised proper supervision to prevent the
offense,” it is not liable under Korean anti-bribery laws. Act No. 10178, art 4 (S. Kor.). The United
Kingdom also recognizes corporate compliance: Under the United Kingdom Bribery Act, the U.K.
Ministry of Justice recognizes that “no policies or procedures are capable of detecting and preventing all
bribery.” Thus, the Bribery Act provides a “full defense if [a company] can show that despite a
particular case of bribery it nevertheless had adequate procedures in place to prevent persons associated
with it from bribing.” By contrast, the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) does not allow such
compliance defense. Some argue that a corporate compliance defense could “better incentivize more
robust corporate compliance, reduce improper conduct, and thus best advance the FCPA’s objective of
reducing bribery.” MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, THE BRIBERY ACT 2010: GUIDANCE 15 (2011),
http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/legislation/bribery-act-2010-guidance.pdf; Mike Koehler,
Revisiting a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Compliance Defense, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 609, 612 (2012).
188
The winning party may recover all litigation costs, such as filing fees, discovery-related
expenses, service of process fees, and witness fees. Sang Ho Han & Inhak Lee, The International
Comparative Legal Guide to: Product Liability 2013: Korea chapter, KIM & CHANG,
http://www.kimchang.com/frame2.jsp?lang=2&b_id=88&m_id=81&mode=view&idx=12232; The
Legal Profession of the Republic of South Korea, HARV. L. PROG. ON LEGAL PROF. (2001),
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/plp/pdf/Korean_Legal_Profession.pdf [hereinafter Study on
Korean Legal Profession].
189
Study on Korean Legal Profession, supra note 188.
190
By contrast, the “American Rule” shields “the losing plaintiff from liability for the legal
expenses of a prevailing defendant.” Carrington, supra note 108, at 38–39.
191
See discussion supra Part IV.A(2).
192
Kim, supra note 17, at 284 (“Under a state-oriented corporate governance system, the [Korean]
government operated in an intertwined, symbiotic relationship with the chaebols.”).
193
Bucy, supra note 8, at 73.
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law can also provide that qui tam actions “cannot be dismissed upon the
government’s motion without an opportunity for the private plaintiff to be
heard publicly in . . . court, and without court approval of the dismissal.”194
Finally, opponents might be concerned that the high attorney fees in
Korea would deter potential whistleblowers from coming forward. While
attorney fees have been relatively high in Korea because lawyers have
historically been low in supply and high in demand, the recent introduction
of a U.S. style law school system and the government’s push to increase the
number of junior Korean lawyers should result in a larger pool, bringing
down litigation costs.195 Also, contingency fee arrangements with plaintiffs’
attorneys are permitted and frequently utilized in Korea.196
C. Other Factors That Merit Discussion
Some may be skeptical of the efficacy of the regulatory framework
that this Comment seeks to establish. Some scholars believe that Korean
anti-corruption legal reforms would not be possible without the
establishment of an independent prosecutor, referring to Korean
prosecutors’ lack of willingness to take on politically sensitive cases in the
1980s and 1990s.197 Another concern involves tightly knit relationships (or
possible collusion) between government and big business, represented by
large family-owned conglomerates, the chaebols.198 These are valid
concerns, but acknowledging these problems does not necessarily negate
the benefits of the proposals discussed in this Comment.
First, while it is true that inside information—however much of a
precious commodity it may be—would be practically worthless if regulators
turn a blind eye on that information, evidence shows that Korean
prosecutors are increasingly willing to investigate and prosecute highprofile corruption cases involving powerful businessmen, former ministers,
and even former presidents, and that Korean courts actually convict them.199
194

Id.
Paramount among the legal reforms in Korea in recent years is the introduction of the Americanstyle law school and civil participation in judicial decision-making. See generally DAI-KWON CHOI,
JUDICIAL SYSTEM TRANSFORMATION IN THE GLOBALIZING WORLD (2007). For a comprehensive
discussion on changes in Korean society in relation to legal reform, see TOM GINSBURG, LEGAL
REFORM IN KOREA (2004).
196
However, in contrast to the general practice in the United States, the Korean practice usually still
requires the plaintiff to pay a certain amount as a down payment, even in the case of a contingency fee
arrangement. Study on Korean Legal Profession, supra note 195.
197
See, e.g., Ehrlich & Kang, supra note 14.
198
Kim, supra note 17, at 284 (“Under a state-oriented corporate governance system, the
government operated in an intertwined, symbiotic relationship with the chaebols.”).
199
See Jun, supra note 81 (“The court also found corporate executives of major Korean
conglomerates guilty of bribing the former Presidents in exchange for government contracts or political
favors.”).
195
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Korea’s active media and greater public attention to court actions also play
important roles in exposing injustice and in pressuring courts to behave
fairly and with greater competence. Further, the recent anti-corruption
enforcement statistics show that the government is determined to end such
practices and actively seeks to enforce its anti-bribery laws.
Much scholarship on Korea’s corruption problem has focused on the
issue of the lenient punishment of chaebols and prominent political
figures.200 Indeed, the detection of misconduct through inside information
(facilitated by the new regulatory framework outlined in this Comment)
may not in all cases lead to just punishment—in the past, political and
industrial elite convicted for bribery received favorable treatments in
Korean courts by way of presidential amnesty and lenient sentencing.201
Setting the just punishment debate aside, the proposals discussed in this
Comment rest on the assumption that increasing the probability of
corruption scrutiny and exposure itself discourages companies and
individuals from engaging in corrupt practices. This may be particularly
important in Korea as Korean culture “emphasizes the concept of one’s
reputation and honor,”202 and the social stigma associated with the
punishment of corruption could have an important deterrent effect. It should
also be noted that companies always worry about reputational damage;
failure to comply with the law and the resulting scrutiny can have several
serious business effects on a business, on top of any fine or penalty amounts
imposed by an enforcement agency or court.203
CONCLUSION
Korea has had great economic success, yet it is often perceived to be a
nation that skirts the rules. Korean law has long outlawed bribery, but the
problem is long standing and persistent. The Korean government (with its
own successful antitrust leniency program, among many others) has
demonstrated its capacity to learn from the experiences and mistakes of
other countries, and to take advantage of these lessons to successfully
200

See, e.g., Jun, supra note 81; Ehrlich & Kang, supra note 14; Kim, supra note 17.
Kim, supra note 17, at 334 (“The presidents routinely granted pardons to convicted controlling
shareholders and executives of large companies.”). For legal authority governing presidential pardons in
Korea, see Samyeon haeng-wi [Amnesty Act], Act. No. 2, Aug. 30, 1948, arts. 3, 5, 9–10 (S. Kor.);
DAEHAN MINKUK HUNBEOB [HUNBEOB] [CONSTITUTION] art. 79 (July 17, 1948) (S. Kor.).
202
Jun, supra note 81, at 1107 (“According to one’s position within the pyramid-structured social
hierarchy, a higher level of deference is given to those with higher status. In a society that focuses on
authority and status, the criminal punishment of prominent political figures would have a greater
deterrent effect . . . because of the larger social stigma associated with such punishment.”).
203
FCPA PROFESSOR BLOG, supra note 54 (explaining that anti-bribery scrutiny could delay or
terminate M&A transactions, as well as “adversely affect a company’s stock price and cost of capital as
credit rating agencies may downgrade corporate debt”).
201
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formulate and enforce its own laws. Learning from the American
experience while recognizing Korea’s unique situations and characteristics
can lead the way to optimal enforcement of Korean anti-bribery laws. The
framework this Comment has presented provides a starting point for that
discussion.
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